Japan's nuclear disaster prevention system entered review regarding the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident and the Nuclear Emergency Response Guideline was revised in 2015. One important task for enhancing the nuclear disaster prevention system is to improve residential evacuations. Evacuating residents during nuclear disasters has unique problems, such as radiation contamination by substances released into the atmosphere, in addition to the problems of natural disasters, such as transportation disruptions. The Nuclear Emergency Response Guideline released by the Nuclear Regulatory implemented for evacuees in case of nuclear disaster (Evacuation Exit Inspection: EEI)." The EEI was proposed after the reports point out the problems faced by local governments concerning evacuations. This report explains the criteria used to implement protections during nuclear facility emergencies and the content of the EEI. It also describes the Aomori Prefecture KEY WORDS: nuclear emergency protection measures, standards, evacuation exit inspections, nuclear disaster prevention system, residential evacuations, Precautionary Action Zone, Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone, Emergency Action Level, Operational Intervention Level.
I INTRODUCTION
Japan's nuclear disaster response system was developed under the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, and Nuclear Emergency Response Guideline. 1) Triggered by the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident in 2011, the Nuclear Emergency Response Guideline was revised in 2015, and reviews of the command system of the medical institutions, residential evacuation plans, and systemization of human resource development are underway.
2) Among these, the residential evacuation plans are particularly dif cult to create because of the complex variety of relevant actors, such as residents, municipal governments, medical facilities, self-defense forces, and re ghting services. Furthermore, evacuations during nuclear disasters are accompanied by contextual problems, such as exposure to radioactive substances in the atmosphere, in addition to the challenges of evacuations during natural disasters (e.g., oods), such as communication and transportation disruptions. Therefore, to plan residential evacuations during nuclear disasters, it is essential to access information on radiation, such as the probability of residents' exposure and or contamination.
3)
The Nuclear Emergency Response Guideline released by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority mandate municipalities to prepare for "inspection to con rm whether radiation protection measures should be implemented for evacuees in case of nuclear disaster (Evacuation Exit Inspection: EEI)". 4) Manuals about EEI also have been published. 5) These guidelines and manuals indicate that new disaster prevention plans are underway throughout Japan. Residents, governmental of cials, and healthcare workers near nuclear power facilities are being trained in disaster prevention drills and trainings regarding residential evacuations, mainly in prefectures with relevant facilities. 6, 7) The EEI was proposed after the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident, but, currently, few educators are familiar with the process and or points of the EEI. Only a few reports on the challenges to municipal governments regarding residential evacuation during nuclear disasters have been published in Japan. Consequently, this paper explains the criteria of protection implementation during a nuclear power facility disaster and the content of the EEI. Further, it describes the content of the 2017 Aomori Prefecture nuclear disaster prevention drill resident evacuation drill, in which the authors participated as lecturers. In addition, it presents issues about the EEI identi ed through the disaster prevention drill.
II PROTECTIVE MEASURES AND CRITERIA OF NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESIDENTIAL EVACUATIONS

Nuclear emergency classi cation and criteria to determine protective measures
In Japan, emergencies at nuclear facilities have three stages: (1) alert, (2) site area emergency, and (3) general emergency. 4) The alert indicates that an abnormal phenomenon has occurred inside the nuclear facility, but no radiation threatens the public. This is the rst stage of the emergency classi cation, and the nuclear facility operator must immediately inform the state of the warning conditions. In some cases, preparations must be made for emergency monitoring and site evacuation. Site area emergency are conditions that might extend outside the facility to in uence the public. In these cases, the nuclear facility operator must immediately notify the state and its local government. In addition, the state and municipal governments should prepare preventive protective measures such as evacuation for residents in the Precautionary Action Zone (PAZ) and carry out evacuation targeting person needing support. General emergency requires rapidly deployed protective measures because they include strong probabilities of radiation effects on the public. At this stage, the state and municipal governments should take preventive protective measures such as evacuation and taking stable iodine for all residents in the PAZ, and also need to take preventative protective measures such as evacuation even within the Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone (UPZ) according to the scale of the nuclear disaster. The Emergency Action Level (EAL) is the criterion used to determine whether a nuclear facility quali es for any of these three emergency classi cations. 4) The EAL is determined by the nuclear facility operators based on their particular situations, such as situation in which each layer equipment constituting the protection at each nuclear power facility and the situation of the con nement function of radioactive materials. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority Japan is mandated to monitor this aspect of emergency protection. Table 1 lists the classi cation stages and describes their protective measures in detail.
In the event of a general emergency, it is extremely important to deploy speci c protective measures, such as evacuations, to avoid harming people. When radiation and radioactive substances are released into the air during a nuclear disaster, people are much more likely than under normal conditions to be exposed or contaminated. Japan's four-level Operational Intervention Level (OIL: OIL1, OIL2, OIL4 and OIL6) is the criteria used to assess the implementation of protective measures. 4) State and municipal governments that implement protective measures must compare the results of their emergency monitoring to the OIL standards ( Table 2) and pre-determine the speci c procedures they must take (if any) to be in compliance, such as determining the scope of 
Overview of the EEI
The EEI is an inspection tool used to ascertain the levels of evacuees' contamination during a nuclear disaster. This inspection is performed when the emergency classi cation is at the general emergency level (see Table 1 ) because radioactive substances might be released at any time into the environment and evacuees might be contaminated. Therefore, evacuees, their belongings, vehicles, and so on are inspected in the municipalities located within about 30 km of the relevant nuclear power facility and simple decontamination and transit to medical facilities are performed as necessary. The EEIs are staffed by the relevant municipal governments and supported by local medical staffs and radiation experts. In other words, under normal conditions, governmental staffs should understand the radiation contamination equipment and personal protective equipment necessary to conduct the EEI and implement countermeasures when contamination is identi ed.
OIL4 is used to ascertain the extent of contamination (see Table 2 ). As soon as possible after a nuclear disaster, an evacuee and the objects he or she is carrying are considered contaminated at 40,000 cpm. When contamination is less than 40,000 cpm, the evacuee is issued an EEI passage certi cate, previously prepared by the relevant municipal government, and the evacuee is moved outside the affected area. When contamination is present, simple decontamination procedures 
Fig. 2
Personnel structure for Emergency Exit Inspection (EEI) tasks. This gure was prepared with reference to the manual of evacuation exit inspections and simpli ed decontamination at nuclear disaster. 5) are performed to reduce the contamination level to a point where it can be handled at the site of acute disasters, such as wiping and undressing. When the contamination is below the standard, the evacuee is issued the EEI passage certi cate and moved outside the affected area. When the contamination does not respond to simple decontamination efforts, the evacuee is transported to institutions with specialized knowledge and skills about decontamination to receive advanced decontamination and dose assessment treatment. The purpose of the EEI is not to correctly decontaminate eeing individuals, but to check for the presence or absence of contamination, and promptly conduct wide-area evacuations.
A minimal amount of time should be spent on contamination inspections, and evacuations should not be delayed. To lessen evacuees' anxieties, the inspectors should quickly provide EEI passage certi cate to uncontaminated evacuees. Education of the relevant governmental of cials and residents should occur under normal conditions to prepare them to quickly and correctly conduct EEI during emergencies. Figure 1 illustrates the EEI process. During a general emergency, a person in a car, bus, and so on rst undergoes a vehicular inspection instead of a personal inspection. When the contamination level of the vehicle is at or higher than the OIL4 level, a personal inspection is performed on the occupant or, in the case of multiple occupants, a representative occupant. When the contamination level of the person exceeds the OIL4 level, contamination tests are performed on all of the vehicle's occupants. All of the items of the occupants who exceed the OIL4 level are then inspected. Under nonemergency conditions, the municipal governments establish the organization of workers most likely to conduct the EEI (Fig. 2) . Furthermore, these governments secure the equipment and materials for personal protection and inspection and they secure the procedures and locations for storage and disposal of contaminated items that exceed the OIL4 level.
The EEI process
III EEI DRILL EXERCISE IN AOMORI PREFECTURE
Information of the EEI drill exercise in Aomori Prefecture
This section describes the 2017 EEI nuclear emergency drill exercise conducted in Aomori Prefecture. Aomori Prefecture includes a commercial nuclear power facility. This drill exercise was intended to prepare governmental staff and local residents for a situation in which the nuclear reactor's water supply function stopped and general emergency ensued. It covered protective measures, a such as evacuations and EEI during evacuations. The drill exercise venue was a large parking lot on the national highway about 30 km from the nuclear power facility, which the local residents would be highly likely to pass if they evacuated the area in vehicles. A schema of the drill exercise venue is shown in Fig 3. Each step in the inspection process was arranged to complete the process described above, and usual occupations, and the numbers of people on the teams. During the drill exercise, about 30 people were involved in evacuation and vehicular inspections, and it was assumed that hair and clothing were contaminated at or above the OIL4 level. The EEI trainees mostly were governmental personnel from the public health center, regional medical and radiology technicians, and radiation experts (university faculty specializing in radiation protection or disaster management) as lecturers. The drill exercise is shown in Fig 4. 
EEI issues
At the end of the training, the experts provided a review. The governmental staff in charge of inspections mentioned the dif culty of using the Geiger-Mueller (GM) survey meter to perform the inspections and the dif culty regarding the sense of distance between the detection surface and the object. In addition, because the trainees were wearing dust mask, it sometimes was dif cult to speak, and communication was challenging. Those who were in charge of simple decontamination of "evacuees" contaminated at or above the OIL4 level stated that it was dif cult to explain the contamination. In other words, the "evacuees" lacked the background knowledge necessary to understand radiation and contamination. In addition, some trainees opined that it was dif cult for the governmental trainees to decide the order in which "evacuees" should be transported to medical facilities based on simple decontamination efforts and rules. Many of the participants stated that, in addition to the OIL criteria, the relevant governments should prepare manuals to explain transportation and destination procedures.
IV SUMMARY
This paper describes the standards for implementing protective measures during a nuclear power facility disaster and the EEI. It summarizes the process as it was applied during drill exercise in Aomori Prefecture and the required tasks to accomplish EEI. Currently, Japan offers few opportunities to learn the standards and practice the procedures. Therefore, the opinions of the trainees are valuable. It is necessary to obtain opinions throughout Japan, improve the EEI tasks, and develop effective human resources.
